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The Cybernetic
“General Model Theory”:
Unifying Science or
Epistemic Change?
Barbara E. Hof
University of Zurich
With the marginalization of cybernetics, efforts to develop a universal episte-
mological method ceased as well. But the question remains open as to whether
cybernetics contributed to the reconceptualization of the model and the popu-
larity of scientific modeling since the mid-twentieth century. The present study
approaches this question using the example of the general model theory of the
German cyberneticist Herbert Stachowiak. Although this theory failed to pro-
duce a unifying and common model concept, its characteristics point toward a
change in epistemological positions that is important for today’s scientiﬁc prac-
tice and also anticipated recent developments in the philosophy of science.
1. Introduction
“The term ‘model’ has become fashionable” (Hesse 1967, p. 354). What
Mary Hesse characterized in the mid-1960s as a trend in logic, mathematics,
and the natural sciences, applies today in general for a broad spectrum of dis-
ciplines. Today models appear to be of “extraordinary importance” (Gähde and
Hartmann 2013, p. 1) compared to the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century,
when models (in contrast to theories) were neither mentioned nor con-
templated, either generally in scientiﬁc publications or speciﬁcally in
the philosophy of science (see Bailer-Jones 2009, p. 18; more explicitly
Bailer-Jones 1999, p. 23). It is even assumed that models are “the key
to science” (Franck 2004) and that today’s science is largely “model based”
(Kuorikoski and Marchionni 2015, p. 381).
Put in general terms, models play a crucial epistemological role: The
idea behind scientiﬁc modeling is to represent and increase information.
The core purpose for using models is the simpliﬁcation, visualization, ide-
alization, modiﬁcation, or hypothetical realization of phenomena together
with the aim making the latter easier to understand. Models are imagined,
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built, empirically or hypothetically tested, compared, and used as the basis
of more adequate future models. But why did the concept of the model
become signiﬁcantly more important in the second half of the twentieth
century? What fostered this transformation and how did it evolve? As
highlighted in two special issues of Perspectives on Science (vol. 21, no. 2,
2013; vol. 23, no. 4, 2015), historians and philosophers of science have
recently dedicated more attention to such questions, debating not only
why and in what disciplines the model concept has frequently appeared,
but also the practice and signiﬁcance of modeling. To be sure, more powerful
computing led to better modeling techniques and visualization methods and
also facilitated simulations of non-accessible objects of inquiry (see Winsberg
2010; Morrison 2015). However, technological advances alone cannot fully
explain the growth of the model’s importance. This article seeks to join the
discussion about the relevance and abundance of models, pursuing the thesis
that their popularity since the mid-twentieth century was also due to a re-
conceptualization of the model itself, which was linked to the model’s change
in functions. Both together also reﬂect a transformation of epistemological
positions during this period.
To provide a background for this argument, we ﬁrst need to outline the
long history of the creation and use of models, showing that the model
concept was never static. “Thinking in models” is older than the term it-
self; for a long time, religious parables, for example, served in a sense as
models to represent abstract actions. However, as far as we know, the word
“model” only began to be increasingly used since the Italian Renaissance,
originating in architecture. At the time, it was interpreted similarly to
today’s understanding of the words “illustration,” “example,” or “replica”
(Müller 1980, pp. 205–06). According to Max Jammer, “model” only
began to be used as a special scientiﬁc term (“terminus technicus”) starting
in the mid-nineteenth century. But he notes that we can ﬁnd precursors of
this development as early as the emergence of modern science around
1600. Francis Bacon, for example, viewed the experimental situation as
a replication—and thus a model—of physical reality. Early-modern cor-
puscular and kinetic theories followed directly from observation and the
building of models (Jammer 1965, pp. 167–9). Hence models were sup-
posed to illustrate empirical phenomena through replication and represen-
tation, as machines imitating nature (such as Jacques de Vaucanson’s
“digesting duck” of 1739). Even before the term “model” became widely
established, mechanical explanations were used to improve our understand-
ing of natural entities. Thus, the prevailing model concept of this epoch was
the mechanical model (see Bailer-Jones 2009; Müller 2009; Gelfert 2016).
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, new scientiﬁc and epis-
temological positions emerged, thereby creating new impulses for the
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reconceptualization of the model, two of which warrant emphasis here.
First, the early critique of positivism—and therefore also of the real-world
validity of models—led to the denial of the truth value of models. Ernst
Mach, for example, interpreted them not as illustrations but rather as
methodological means for expedient simpliﬁcation (Jammer 1965, p. 171).
The rise of instrumentalism may not have eliminated the model’s represen-
tational function, but this function was devalued, whereas the function of
simpliﬁcation gained importance.
Second, with the mathematization of various branches of science during
the ﬁrst third of the twentieth century, the sciences embarked upon a radical
and sustained reorientation, which also meant that the mechanical models of
classical physics lost their preeminence (Bailer-Jones 2009, p. 21–6).
According to Ernst Cassirer (1929), science ﬁrst became systematic by be-
coming, strictly understood, a symbolic language. Changes to the nature of
the model reﬂected this transformation of the conception of science: ad-
vances in abstract mathematics led to the model’s semantic modiﬁcation.
The formal model of mathematical logic emerged at the intersection of
algebra, non-Euclidean geometry, deductive logic, and set theory, which
was formulated in the early twentieth century. They were prerequisites
for mathematical model theory, developed in large part by Alfred Tarski
and based on his earlier semantic truth deﬁnition (Bourbaki 1994, pp. 22–3;
Müller 1965, p. 154). The formal mathematical model subsequently became
an important part of the methodology of the exact sciences. It rapidly
spread into numerous application areas, such as statistics and data analysis,
where the model represented a set of numbers on the basis of what was
construed as a superordinate formal logic. The shift of dominance from
the mechanical model of the nineteenth century to the formal model is just
one—albeit key—indication that the concept of the model was being con-
tinually redeﬁned and that its functions varied.
The deductive, formally logical operation with symbols threw compet-
ing model applications into question, triggering repercussions for the
social and human sciences and especially for behavioral science. These
ﬁelds, too, featured long traditions of using models to explain invisible
bodily processes (for example, blood circulation and thinking) through
replicas and simulations. Long before the term “model” became resound-
ingly popular in the mid-1960s, medicine and also behavioral science were
based on mechanical model concepts, or, in other words, “the practice of
using machinery to approximate nature” (Riskin 2003, p. 98). In addition,
psychology in particular was already using heuristic structures in the sense
of a hypothetical “as if ” at an early stage (apparent in Sigmund Freud’s
hydraulic model) alongside classical models borrowed from architecture
(for example, the “body model”). These heuristic models are functional,
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that is, in order to represent mental processes, paths are used that graph-
ically represent the direction, inﬂuence, and magnitude of one variable
which inﬂuences another variable, whereas gradations within a diagram
often illustrate maturation or learning processes (Herzog 1984, p. 92).
Functional perspectives require us to address models as concrete entities, which
are constructed for epistemic purposes.
The heuristic method is hardly in a position to fully depict the real
world; at the same time, it is not identical with formal logic. But the
mathematical principle of non-contradiction puts pressure on heuristics;
more precisely, by the mid-twentieth century formal logic had developed
into an authoritative reference point for widely ranging ﬁelds of knowl-
edge. Thus, according to Peter Achinstein, advocates of logical empiricism
(who predominantly shaped scientiﬁc theory at the time) understood the
meaning of the model “in a single sense,” namely, as exclusively following
mathematical logic (Achinstein 1964, p. 328). Formalistic-deductive
positions were even advocated in the practice of social and human
sciences—from psychology to linguistics (“structuralism”)—as evidenced,
for example, by efforts to grasp language development by means of “pre-
formulated theoretical conceptions” (Hartmann 1965, p. 371). According
to Hunter Heyck, given the assumption that mathematics was the
“language of discovery,” in the mid-twentieth century there was also “no
question that a reformed behavioral science would be mathematical”
(Heyck 2015, p. 35). The American psychologist Richard C. Atkinsons
maintained the position, for example, that human learning could be
formally modeled by means of mathematics, and thus generally explained.
Atkinson noted that, admittedly, a few behavioral scientists voiced doubts
that this would ever be possible, but “similar objections were raised to
mathematical physics as recently as the late 19th century, and only the
brilliant success of the approach silenced opposition” (Atkinson 1961,
pp. 46–7). This led him to conclude that, thanks to the mathematical
concept of the model, psychology would soon be able to register similar
successes.
This outline points toward the fact that the position and use of formalism
was highly charged with meaning. At the same time, the outline clearly
shows that—contrary to its seemingly universal and timeless claims of
validity—various conceptualizations of the model have competed against
each other for interpretive supremacy. Most notably, in the 1960s Mary
Hesse presented the idea that (old) mechanical models serve as analogues
of the object of inquiry. By recognizing analogy as a means to compare
known with unknown objects, and by arguing that this process was crucial
for scientiﬁc reasoning (Hesse 1966), she qualiﬁed the primacy of formal
models. This paper will argue that the rivalry of different concepts did not
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result in a common terminology, rather, it has ultimately meant that func-
tion attributions of the model concept have increased.
As shown at the outset, models also appear important today; moreover,
the term is widely dispersed among various different disciplines from
mathematics to the natural, social, and human sciences, and to the human-
ities (Morgan and Grüne-Yanoff 2013, p. 144). According to Hunter
Heyck (2015, pp. 24–5), however, since the 1970s not only is the model
concept being used more often, the types of models have increased as well.
Thus, at that time there seems to have been a new turning point in the his-
tory of the model. This article attempts to show that with the so-called
cognitive turn around 1970, the functions of the model multiplied again;
in other words, this article seeks to work out how the model concept
changed due to this epistemological transformation.
In doing so, this article joins with Daniela Bailer-Jones, who structured
the “shifts of interests regarding models” since 1950 into three epochs: a
popularization phase characterized by the initial deﬁnition of concepts,
followed in a second phase by a shift from “formal to functional charac-
terization,” which in a third phase was complemented by the “cognitive
perspective on scientiﬁc modeling” (Bailer-Jones 1999, p. 35). The latter
implies that models are comparable to cognitive aids, or: “Models [are no
longer viewed] exclusively in terms of their role in science, but in terms of
their role for human cognition” (ibid., pp. 37–8). Tarja Knuuttila made a
similar argument concerning contemporary cognitive science, according to
which knowledge is bound to the ability to (intentionally) construct
(Knuuttila 2005, p. 1266). Accordingly, human powers of imagination
are nowadays seen as playing a central role in the conceptualization of our
knowledge, and this process of internal construction ﬁnds expression in
the medium of the model. This means that the model is not a “representa-
tion” of the real world but rather an “epistemic tool” (Boon and Knuuttila
2008).
The substantive consequences of the cognitive turn for the model concept
have thus far hardly been elucidated (e.g., Kuorikoski and Marchionni 2015,
p. 385n). Therefore, the following three sections shall use a case study to
delve into the transition between the second (“functional”) and third (“cog-
nitive perspective”) phases, focusing on a work that has previously received
little attention in the debate regarding the model: the General Model Theory
(Allgemeine Modelltheorie) of 1973. The author of the text was the German
cyberneticist Herbert Stachowiak (1927–2004). Although his scholarly
estate allows few conclusions about the preliminary work on his model
theory, it nonetheless reveals his intention to derive the deﬁnition of the
model from its “actual use,” which for Stachowiak (1973, p. 1) was equiv-
alent to empiricism. Precisely because he applied his method inductively
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to the linguistic usage of his contemporaries, his work thoroughly docu-
mented the transformation of the model concept.
Roland Müller notes that Stachowiak developed one of the most elab-
orate classiﬁcations of the model, which then was “widely ignored” (Müller
2004, p. 256). The fact that it was never translated is a major reason why
the general model theory is little known outside the German-speaking
world (Ritchey 2012, p. 3). Nonetheless, it provides an informative source
for the aforementioned transformation of the model concept. On the one
hand, it allows us to trace why models have become so important for con-
temporary scientiﬁc practice; on the other hand, it constitutes a precursive
development of recent discussions in the philosophy of science that equate
models with “epistemic tools.” In the general model theory, this shift of
perspective from the model as product to the model as instrument reads
almost paradigmatically.
Stachowiak had received his doctorate in mathematics in West Berlin
during the post-war period, but dedicated his attention to issues pertain-
ing to scientiﬁc theory, morality, psychology, and educational planning,
turning increasingly to philosophy, particularly pragmatism. Working ﬁrst
as a night school director, he established his footing in academia relatively
late. In 1973 he was appointed to the professorial chair for scientiﬁc and
planning theory in Paderborn. His biography as an academic all-rounder is
emblematic for cybernetics, a ﬁeld that was highly inﬂuential but concep-
tually almost impossible to grasp.
According to Stachowiak, the model’s increased importance since the
mid-twentieth century can be explained by the advances of formalism
and the deductive method, and was also founded in the “cybernetic move-
ment” (Stachowiak 1983, p. 11). General Model Theory is a contribution to
cybernetic thought in the context of Germany’s post-war history. Thus, the
ﬁrst section below not only presents the cybernetic concept of the model
but also historicizes the speciﬁcity of German cybernetics. The second sec-
tion focuses on the development of the general model concept. Using these
characteristics as a basis, the third section then explicates a consequential
reformulation of epistemological positions.
2. Bridging Disciplinary Boundaries with the Model
Cybernetics—the term was coined by mathematician Norbert Wiener—
emerged from the United States in the mid-twentieth century. Although
originating in technical engineering problems, it claimed to form the gravi-
tational center of various scientiﬁc and technical disciplines and thus to be a
universal science with a common unifying language (Bowker 1993). To this
end, fragments of knowledge from mathematics, physics, and linguistics
brought to the United States through the emigration of many researchers were
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combined with American pragmatism and behavioral science (Lafontaine
2004, 2007). Closely tied to this conglomerate was the claim to bundle knowl-
edge into models that were valid at an explicitly interdisciplinary level, based
on concepts such as feedback, signal, information, and entropy. Modeling was
an important method of cybernetics: abstraction from the concrete
in conjunction with a focus on commonalities in order to arrive at compara-
ble data was programmatic. Visual aids, metaphors, and diagrams therefore
formed the core of cybernetic language (Hagner 2006; Hörl 2008). On the
one hand, they facilitated interdisciplinary translations; on the other hand,
they were tools for communicating with the public.
Two aspects of the cybernetic model are striking. First, it is a functional
model concept; thus, it concentrates on processes that are inferred by
means of reduction, or, in the words of two founders of cybernetics:
“abstraction consists in replacing the part of the universe under consider-
ation by a model of similar but simpler structure” (Rosenblueth and
Wiener 1945, p. 316). Second, the cybernetic model builds on the prin-
ciple of analogy in the belief of thereby facilitating progress:
The test of the usefulness of this new science, as that of any science,
must be its results. … That is to say, the analogies which cybernetics
may suggest between communication channels or control processes
in machines, nerve systems, and human societies must in turn
suggest new observations or new experiments. (Deutsch 1951,
p. 240; emphasis added)
Conclusion by analogy was the preferred modus operandi of cybernetics.
Moreover, the orientation of cybernetics toward results clearly points to
the fact that cybernetics reestablished and reinterpreted instrumentalism
in the post-war period. Despite this hereditary relationship to the scientiﬁc
theory of instrumentalism, cybernetics was perceived within and outside
of science as a renewal movement. Its attraction derived from the Allied
victory in the Second World War, achieved in part by involving researchers
who tested their theories and calculations in practice (see Galison 1994).
Precisely because wartime research was geared toward application, instru-
mentalism received a boost.
The second-generation cybernetic theorist Anthony Wilden, who
explicitly elevated cybernetics to the “science of models,” located the
origins of cybernetics in technology, but noted that from here its transfer
was pursued to non-technical applications. According to Wilden, models
are an abstract vocabulary that can be applied to any particular object of
study. Their use is associated with the hope of unifying scientiﬁc cultures
and “of introducing new order into the currently disordered state of dis-
course of science” (Wilden 1979, p. 9–11).
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The idea of an application-related science became increasingly popular
on both sides of the Cold War ideological divide. In particular, the allures
of reform efforts based on the rationality concept of praxis-oriented science
shined forcefully onto the politically and culturally disoriented environment
of post-war Germany. The project to reorganize the sciences met with the
need for a new start—the objectifying, techno-optimistic program of cyber-
netics offered an opportunity to “veer away from the repertoire of German
traditions of thought” (Hagner 2008, p. 52). For contemporaries, it prom-
ised a “path to a new unity of the sciences” (Steinbuch 1962) and was
declared to be the method “for integrating our ﬁndings about society and
man” (Klaus 1967, p. VII) or even an “umbrella science” (Lutz 1970).
In the context of widespread enthusiasm for United States—that is, the
appropriation during the post-war period of American ideas, a process that
differed from the previous “European-American exchange of ideas” (Doering-
Manteuffel 2011)—the transfer of cybernetics was virtually unidirectional,
with the exception of supportive contributions by the philosopher Gotthard
Günther and criticisms by Martin Heidegger. Awareness of the German off-
shoot of cybernetics, associated with names such as Max Bense, Georg Klaus,
Karl Steinbuch, and Helmar Frank, barely reached beyond the national bor-
ders. However, the inner German border did not pose an obstacle for the
basic assumptions of cybernetics.
The logician Georg Klaus played a major role in the reception of cy-
bernetics in East Germany, where it evolved into a dialectic-materialist
method (Segal 2004, p. 234). Notably important for West Germany
was the engineer Hermann Schmidt, creator of the General Regulation
Theory (Allgemeine Regelungskunde) (see Dittmann 1999; Bissell 2011).
Schmidt, too, adopted the cybernetic claim of universality, expressed par-
ticularly in its modeling method’s search for analogies. He maintained:
“Among the secure possessions of cybernetics is the technical-organic feed-
back analogy, toward which the cybernetic collaboration of a growing num-
ber of non-technical sciences, for example, biology, physiology, sociology,
and philosophy, is orienting itself” (Schmidt 1966). In Germany, too, uni-
versal models were supposed to be used to bridge disciplinary boundaries.
In both East and West Germany, efforts to elaborate a general deﬁnition
of the model concept were undertaken with explicit reference to cyber-
netics. In East Germany, Klaus-Dieter Wüstneck published an article in
1963 entitled “On the Philosophical Generalization and Determination of
the Model Concept” (“Zur philosophischen Verallgemeinerung und
Bestimmung des Modellbegriffs”) in which he found that the “rapid de-
velopment and expansion of cybernetics” was invigorating the method of
modeling, but no generalization was available yet (Wüstneck 1963,
p. 1504). How the West German Herbert Stachowiak made his way to
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cybernetics remains unknown; nor do we know whether he was familiar
with Wüstneck’s text when he drafted his article “Thoughts on a General
Theory of Models” (“Gedanken zu einer allgemeinen Theorie der Modelle”).
However, we know that he was linked into a network of scientists, techni-
cians, and industrialists who in the 1960s met weekly in West Berlin for
“cybernetic tea parties” and regularly invited Hermann Schmidt as a guest
speaker (Hof 2016, p. 82). As part of this circle that used cybernetic models
to understand human learning, Stachowiak developed a “psycho-structural
model,” which he presented at a conference in 1964 and subsequently pub-
lished in 1965 as a monograph entitled Thinking and Cognition in the Cyber-
netic Model (Denken und Erkennen im kybernetischen Modell) . He integrated
within this model a concept of learning (called “learning matrix”) taken
from the IT pioneer Karl Steinbuch and the human cyberneticist Helmar
Frank, linking this “learning matrix” to a concept of motivation (Stachowiak
1965a). At the same time, he worked out a deﬁnition of the model that was
supposed to meet the challenge of consolidating various different concepts
and establishing generally valid characteristics, which he also published in
1965 as “Thoughts on a General Theory of Models.” This work earned
Stachowiak recognition within German cybernetic circles and beyond: in
1971, part of the article was translated in Spanish; and in 1972 Stachowiak
directed a version translated into English to the UNESCO publication Sci-
entiﬁc Thought (Stachowiak [1971] 1972). So, what is the content of this
model theory?
3. The General Concept of the Model as Based in Cybernetics
The example of West Germany afﬁrms the nascent popularity of the term
“model”—and, more speciﬁcally, the evaluation of formal logic—in the
mid-1960s. In 1965, the impressive tally of 23 articles appeared in the
interdisciplinary journal Studium Generale, founded in 1947 and dedicated
to the “unity of the sciences.” With the exception of Herbert Stachowiak,
the authors referred to their own disciplines, comparing them to others.
Gert Müller discussed the origins of the model in mathematics and qual-
iﬁed any claim of universality by explaining that there were hardly any
connections between the mathematical model and other “concepts of
models and schemas” (Müller 1965, p. 164). Max Jammer addressed the
change of the meaning of the model in physics. According to Jammer, it
had lost its function as an “illustration,” whereas with the emergence of
quantum physics around 1900 it became central as a “criterion of logical
freedom from contradiction.” But its function as a “logical instrument of
modern science” did not exclude other functions (Jammer 1965, p. 172).
With regard to biology, Gernot Wendler argued that the “meaning of the
word model” was not “bindingly determined.” In his opinion, “model” was
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developing into a “vogue term.” He surmised that “a vogue expression
arises … if the concept’s application area suddenly becomes topical or if
the conceptual content is subject to rapid change.” Thus he insisted that
the model’s enormous popularity at the time was based on a heightened
sensitivity to its change of functions (Wendler 1965, p. 284).
Notably, a few authors criticized mathematics, explicitly questioning its
use for the practice of social and human sciences and drawing striking
conclusions. They emphasized alternatives to formal logic and its models,
by which they meant a respective discipline’s traditional, practicable,
representation-theoretical, or functional concepts. Thus, according to
Gottfried Bombach, economics featured a long tradition of model think-
ing, evident, for example, in the “thought template” of the economic cycle.
Mathematics had started a “triumphal march in modern modeling,” but
“not every application of mathematics in economics already [involved]
model analysis” (Bombach 1965, p. 339). The psychologist Wolfgang
Metzger equated models with demonstrative hypotheses, noting “that one
arrives at certain testable predictions not only on the basis of mathematical
models.” Restricting psychology to models derived from mathematics did
not make sense, for it remained to be seen whether demonstrative or formal
models would be more successful (Metzger 1965, p. 352). August Vetter
similarly concluded that psychology was departing from the “atomistic
fragmentation of psychic life” which set in around 1900. Gestalt psychol-
ogy was in the ﬁrst stage of “freeing psychological investigation from the
spell of the physical mindset and regaining its independence” (Vetter
1965, p. 353). These statements by scientists from diverse ﬁelds illustrate
a shift in the conception of the model combined with a critique of the
(exclusive) use of formal logic and mathematical models. We cannot deﬁn-
itively conﬁrm from the source material that the authors’ choice of words
was inﬂuenced by the dawning crisis of logical empiricism, reﬂected in
Germany by the “positivism dispute”; but it conformed to the zeitgeist.
The development of the General Model Theory stood precisely against this
background of a rejection of formal models that, from the perspective of
hands-on researchers, proved inadequate for subjects of the social and
human sciences. Herbert Stachowiak engaged in criticism as well, but
did not invoke a traditional discipline-speciﬁc model concept; instead,
he formulated a new supradisciplinary cognitive construct. In “Thoughts
on a General Theory of Models,” he maintained that the numerous efforts
to grasp the meaning of the “model” followed from the increased impor-
tance of models, noting that the reason lies in a “deep-seated” change of
“scientiﬁc-philosophical thought” (Stachowiak 1965b, p. 432). In line
with the cybernetic jargon of renewal, he located this upheaval in the Second
World War and advanced the thesis that philosophy no longer had any
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inﬂuence on the “sudden upward trend” of research. Rather, (neo-) empiri-
cism and (neo-) positivism had become central, but they were merely pre-
cursors to far more sweeping developments. According to Stachowiak,
both scientiﬁc-theoretical perspectives are in a “transition [to a] neoprag-
matic movement spreading increasingly over the world, taking place in
which was the rediscovery of the anthropologically original function of
science as an instrument for human coping with existence” (Stachowiak
1965b, p. 433). This movement, he argued, was characterized by heuris-
tic liberality and an indifference with regard to veriﬁcation theory: “Any
path that leads to a scientiﬁc theory that is useful for the practical coping
with existence is permitted.” In turn, theories only had to fulﬁll a prag-
matic usefulness criterion, namely, enabling purposeful and systematic
action (Stachowiak 1965b, p. 434).
Even though Stachowiak did not explain his reasons choosing the term
“neopragmatism,” we can ﬁnd three important references. First, by deﬁning
models as representatives of their (neither directly comprehensible nor visi-
ble) original (Stachowiak 1965b, p. 438), Stachowiak follows a semiotic
understanding. In other words, his interpretation of the concept of the
model corresponds to the two-sided character of epistemology as developed
by Charles Sanders Peirce. His concept of science involves a reinterpretation
of American pragmatism in the context of German circumstances, combined
with a dissociation from continental European philosophy (exempliﬁed by
idealism, dialectical materialism, and existentialism) (Stachowiak 1965b,
pp. 432–33). Second, Stachowiak’s position is obviously cybernetically
based: he makes a clear break between research before and after the Second
World War and closely links knowledge to practical, progress-oriented
application. As Michael Hagner has argued, it is precisely this amalgam
of knowledge and implementation—episteme plus techne—that forms the
central pillar of cybernetic theory (Hagner 2008, p. 39). Third, the notion
that the success of science can logically be measured according to its purpose
points to the logic of instrumentalism inherent to cybernetics.
The neopragmatic concept of science now corresponds very narrowly
with the model concept broadly used today in empirical research. …
The increasing pragmatization of scientiﬁc thought … ﬁnds its
characteristic expression in the growing tendency of scientists to describe
numerous if not all cognitive constructs of modern experiential-scientiﬁc
research as “models.” (Stachowiak 1965b, p. 436)
As a consequence of the “neopragmatic concept,” Stachowiak introduces a
general concept of the model that, regardless of its relevance, is to be kept
bare of content so as to be as all-encompassing as possible. This purpose
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requires the formulation of a concise catalogue of features that subsumes
existing concepts (Stachowiak 1965b, p. 437). Thus in short, the general
validity of the model builds on a disengagement from disciplinary thought
and on a dearth of content. Following from Ludwig von Bertalanffy’s General
System Theory, the development of a general model theory necessitated a search
for structural commonalities of method-related ﬁelds of knowledge in order
to place them on the meta level (Stachowiak 1965b, p. 454).
Funded by the German Research Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsge-
meinschaft), Stachowiak worked out his article about the concept and rele-
vance of the model. He further honed his theses, setting them apart from
other scientiﬁc-theoretical perspectives and thereby taking a clear position
in favor of “experiential sciences.” First, he explains that the semantic
model concept of deductive mathematical logic, as formulated by Alfred
Tarski, cannot be generalized. The term model must be grasped more
broadly to include not only formal but also technical models, as well as
models of empirical sciences and also heuristics (Stachowiak 1973, p. 3).
The objection “against the transfer of the logical-semantic model concept to
the experiential sciences” is that it “in no way does justice to widely prac-
ticed scientiﬁc linguistic usage.” Instead, an appropriate general model con-
cept must be derived from practical usage, that is, inductively (Stachowiak
1965b, pp. 1–4). With recourse to Karl Popper, Stachowiak then qualiﬁes
critical rationalism by rejecting the falsiﬁcation principle with regard to the
use of models. Models can be improved but not refuted; it is important to
“comprehend de facto scientiﬁc progress from the speciﬁc manner of its
realization… and from this give methodological instructions on how future
scientiﬁc progress can be ensured” (Stachowiak 1965b, p. 49). Hence the
importance of the “decision” to create a model concept that is neoprag-
matically liberal in the sense of not impeding progress (Stachowiak
1965b, p. 51). According to Stachowiak, everything could be a model,
from the most elementary perception to the most complicated theory, from
metaphysics to the natural sciences (Stachowiak 1965b, pp. 56–7). In
another text published in 1983, he enlarged his position that metaphysics
was not only speculative and that the boundary between metaphysics and
science was only established by convention (Stachowiak 1983). In this
respect, his understanding of science became more nuanced in that it
marked an accommodation of conventionalism.
However, Stachowiak was no longer able to build on his success with
“Thoughts on a General Theory of Models” in 1965, which had coincided
with the peak of cybernetics in Germany. Even though it dealt with the “great
names” and concepts of scientiﬁc theory of the twentieth century, his overall
work remained relatively unknown. It generated signiﬁcant resonance only
in German pedagogy, whose orientation toward action proved extremely
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compatible with the general model concept, which favors utility and irrefut-
ability as opposed to theories that are difﬁcult to grasp (Hof 2016).
Meanwhile, in 1999 the German Society of Cybernetics (Deutsche Gesellschaft
für Kybernetik) honored Stachowiak for his work (Piotrowski 2010). By this
time, however, cybernetics had drifted to the fringes of scientiﬁc debates and
publications. Its fortunes had already collapsed in the late 1960s in both East
and West Germany. For East Germany, the chief reason for this collapse is
assumed to be the closing of the border to the West in connection with the
Prague Spring. As in other Eastern Bloc states, after 1968 intellectuals were
accused of “revisionism” if they referred to works by Western academics.
Cybernetics lost acceptance and became suspected of criticizing the regime;
by the time Erich Honecker took over the leadership of the SED, it was open-
ly rejected (Segal 2004, p. 244). At the same time, in West Germany a grow-
ing rift had opened up between cybernetics’ real technological potential for
renewal and its reception in the media and scientiﬁc discourse, comparable to
developments in the United States. As Ronald Kline (2015) concludes from
the history of American cybernetics, it was never “one thing,” despite the
claims of some of its promoters. Similarly, in West Germany interdisciplinary
committees may have shared technology oriented futuristic visions, but prac-
tical reception played out within existing disciplines (see Aumann 2009,
2011). Research money remained tied to institutional frameworks; to be
sure, funding was announced for technological megaprojects, but not for meta-
theoretical projects (see Coy 2004). Cybernetics enhanced application-oriented
research and became the basis for many technologies. Yet even though it was
inﬂuential, cybernetics never became an overarching universal science.
Moreover, as Joseph Agassi (1995) has noted, there is no “theory of the
model.” Different kind of models, such as scale models, diagrams, math-
ematical formalisms, pictures, illustrations, and artifacts suit a range of
functions. An all-encompassing and singular deﬁnition of the model does
not exist; at most, there are similarities in the interpretation and applica-
tion of models – despite the attempt by the German mathematician Bernd
Mahr after the turn of the millennium to (once more) formulate a “model
of model-being” (see Mahr 2004, 2008, 2015). Even though the general
model theory tried to grasp models in general, a valid transdisciplinary
concept failed to prevail in either the philosophy or practice of science.
Instead, the consensus is that there is a wide spectrum of interpretations
that have too little in common to justify a single substantively standard-
ized perspective (see Hartmann 1995; Bailer-Jones 2002; Koperski 2006;
Gelfert 2011; Frigg and Hartmann 2012).
Thus, neither the general model theory nor cybernetics engendered a
lasting unifying method. The view of models as purpose speciﬁc and in-
different with regard to veriﬁcation theory, however, seems widespread.
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Without referring to Stachowiak, Jürgen Mittelstraß, for example, con-
cluded: “Models [are] neither true nor false but rather strongly applicable
or weakly applicable… They are determined by a pragmatic criterion, not a
truth criterion” (Mittelstraß 2005). In his theory, Stachowiak evidently
presented arguments that are shared by a larger research community;
and this gives us reason, despite the theory’s lack of prominence, to eluci-
date an aspect of the general model theory that illustrates how a change of
epistemological-theoretical perspective resulted in the attribution of a new
function and utility to the model concept. Stachowiak did not preﬁgure
this change but, as an observer of scientiﬁc “linguistic usage,” he recog-
nized and formulated it in his own words.
4. Toward the Inclusion of the Interpreter
As elaborated above, the founding of the general model concept resulted
from a critique of the reach of formal logic and its semantic model, which
from the viewpoint of researchers in subareas of the social and human
sciences did not have enough explanatory power. This conceptual crisis,
reﬂected in the disputes of 1965 in the Studium Generale, foregrounded
model functions that deviated from those of the classical concept of the model.
One such function corresponds to a recent development that popularized the
re-terming of the model as a “tool.” As before, this shift in the concept of the
model can be traced back to competing epistemological positions.
Besides diverging interpretations of the model, a main difference lies be-
tween the classical concept of formal logic, on the one hand, and pragmatic
functional approaches, on the other hand. Although both concepts suggest the
idea of models as representations, recent pragmatist positions deﬁne the
“model” as an independent entity between two positions, in other words,
as a “mediator” between the user and the object of inquiry (Morrison and
Morgan 1999). Furthermore, in the wake of criticizing the concept of repre-
sentation as proving “too limiting” on its own to understand the utility of
models, Mike Boon and Tarja Knuuttila have elaborated the idea of models
as “epistemic tools” (Boon and Knuuttila 2008, p. 694). The general model
theory by Herbert Stachowiak is a precursor of this development, as evident
from its three “pragmatic characteristics” of the model concept:
Models are not only models of something. They are also models for
someone. … A fully pragmatic determination of the model concept
must consider not only the question as to what something is the model
of, but also for whom, when, and what for. (Stachowiak 1973, p. 133)
The inclusion of the interpreter (“for whom”) introduces new meaning that
moves the model away from classical functions such as illustration, reduction,
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or analogy. The question about the subject adds a third position to the
relationship between the model and phenomenon, or in Stachowiak’s words:
“We are the ones who design the modeling that emulates the originals”
(Stachowiak 1973, p. 288). This foregrounded modeling as a varying and
revisable process, instead of the model as a static product.
This expansion of the model concept to include the user and his inter-
pretation should be seen as the result of the cognitive turn around 1970.
As Roland Müller (Müller 2009, p. 651) noted, it is widely accepted that
humans make sense of the world by forming internal representations. Yet
this insight was neglected by behaviorism during its heyday in the ﬁrst
half of the twentieth century, which focused on external and visible con-
sequences of behavior. Only in the course of the cognitive turn did the
notion of mental representation become accepted again. This turn in-
volved, among other things, making the mental performance of the model-
ing subject part of cognition per se. More speciﬁcally, the epistemological
concept of constructivism called objectivity into question, namely, by in-
terpreting cognition as a process that is distinct from its object and actively
carried out by a subject (see von Foerster and von Glaserfeld 1999). This
change dovetails with the full distinction of the instrumental importance
of models: to be sure, it has always been widely accepted that models
represent their phenomenon (whether these are axioms or biological pro-
cesses), but now the focus shifted to the question of mediating between
the phenomenon and the interpreter through the medium of the model,
or, as claimed by Stachowiak: “All cognition is cognition in models or
through models” (Stachowiak 1973, p. 56; 1980, p. 29). Although we
still know remarkably little about the impact of the cognitive turn on
philosophy of science, it is evident that the concept of the model acquired
new meaning.
Tarja Knuuttila has also recently pragmatically qualiﬁed the model con-
cept; and she, too, concluded that representation is characterized not so
much by the “pure” determination of the relationship between model
and phenomenon than by the fact that it must raise the question as to
its utility (Knuuttila 2011, p. 266). Stachowiak’s “neopragmatic” concep-
tion of the model, which insists on taking into account “for whom, when,
and why” a model is created, should thus be seen as a precursor of today’s
characterization of the model as an “epistemic tool” or “useful instrument”
to mediate between the user and the phenomenon under study. Even
though the general model theory is not very well known and failed in
its ambition to help create an all-encompassing model concept, it testiﬁes
to the change toward the “cognitive perspective” (Bailer-Jones 1999),
which is particularly distinguished by the expansion of model functions
to include a subject position and by an orientation to pragmatic criteria.
90 Cybernetic General Model Theory
5. Concluding Remarks
Unifying science or epistemic change? In summary, we can conclude that
concepts like the scientiﬁc model do not exist as supra-historical ideas but
rather are subject to competing interpretations. Even though the super-
ordinate ﬁgure of thought of the cybernetically based model concept could
not prevail against the plurality of disciplinary interpretations and establish
itself as a meta-concept, it exempliﬁes a consequential modiﬁcation of the
function of models. Nonetheless, despite the importance of “modeling”
for cybernetic instrumentalism, the question of the impact of cybernetics on
the reconceptualization process of themodelmust remain open, insofar as there
are too many contradictions between the de facto lack of reception of its the-
oretical structure and the simultaneous turn to a (neo-) pragmatic, purpose-
oriented cognitive theory, which cannot be imagined without the subject’s
involvement as the decision-maker regarding utility and the lack thereof.
With a view to the present, in closing it must be concluded that the in-
terpretation of models as “tools” does not constitute a value-free addendum:
instruments are subject to the risk of an implied neutrality that in fact is not
neutral at all. If models do not merely depict and reduce, if they are not in-
dependent of the mental performance of construction, then models, on the one
hand, are determined by human objectives and ideas and, on the other hand,
possess the potential “to reshape social reality in a way that also affects human
desires and interests” (Gelfert 2016, p. 116). If the world is mediated to us by
instruments, we must be aware that these instruments pre-structure our per-
ception. The role, signiﬁcance, and function of models and modeling are thus
far from being deﬁnitively elucidated.
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